The Trial That Is Action: On Emily Dickinson’s “What I can do — I will”

“What I can do — I will“
Emily Dick­in­son

What I can do — I will –
Though it be lit­tle as a Daf­fodil –
That I can­not — must be
Unknown to possibility –

Com­men­tary:

The third line of this poem ought to begin with “what” instead of “that,” if it is to be strictly par­al­lel with the first line. Since it is not strictly par­al­lel, it must relate to the thought of the first line in some way other than oppo­si­tion (can/cannot).

The key to the speaker’s “doing” in the first two lines is that while what will be done can be done (“on earth, as it is in heaven” res­onates as I say that), such efforts where the spirit moves the flesh in an act of will are “lit­tle as a Daffodil.”

Such efforts are marked by growth, but a lack of vis­i­ble motion. Such efforts are marked by beauty, but not in grandeur or power, but small­ness and del­i­cate­ness. Is this really “effort” we’re look­ing at, or a state­ment of being where one can­not, in a fun­da­men­tal sense, tran­scend one’s ori­gins through becoming?

Our speaker forces us to move on, of course, instead of answer­ing this incred­i­bly large ques­tion that might have con­se­quences for all of mankind. For even if only some peo­ple act like daf­fodils — per­haps there are those, like Shake­speare, who can imag­ine them­selves to be roar­ing fires or strong trees — the ques­tion of what those peo­ple rep­re­sent com­pared to the rest of us is per­ti­nent. They might have some­thing to do with the sun­light that the philoso­phers enjoy out­side of the Cave. They might have some­thing to do with the con­tem­pla­tive life, described in the last book of Aristotle’s Ethics. — One should ask if the con­tem­pla­tive is marked by intel­lec­tual move­ment for­ward, or intel­lec­tual move­ment towards the ori­gins of things, too. -

And yet, mov­ing on, we are con­fronted with “that I can­not.” Can­not describes his actions exactly the same as can; the non-possibilities are the range of pos­si­bil­i­ties. It looks like the speaker can do every­thing in being a daf­fodil, for “can­not” is “unknown” to pos­si­bil­ity. And yet, “can­not” is a clever way of describ­ing what a plant does. It sits and grows. But what does it do?

Nor­mally, one would say the con­tem­pla­tive is not about action. It’s about get­ting your­self away from the world and avoid­ing action. But Emily is a sharp woman. She sees that human life, in terms of its doing, can­not be tran­scended so sim­ply. Doing has to be rec­on­ciled with being some­how in order for the con­tem­pla­tive to exist. In this poem, I think the prob­lem is merely intro­duced, with a hint towards its poten­tial solu­tion: ulti­mately, we will say that grow­ing — an ideal, a hope, com­ing into being — is the great­est doing. But the thought that will lead us there comes not from the image pre­sented, but from a recon­sid­er­a­tion of “can” and “can­not.” We have to see that “not-doing” is not “not-being” nec­es­sar­ily in order to grasp the seri­ous­ness of the image.

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4 Comments

  • isabella mori wrote:

    thanks for this!

    That I can­not — must be
    Unknown to possibility –”

    i think the “that” may have all kinds of mean­ings. i sus­pect she is def­i­nitely play­ing with the fact that the “that” and the “what” are to sim­i­lar, giv­ing us more than one layer of meaning.

    and the “must” is inter­est­ing, too. should it be unknown to pos­si­bil­ity? must it never?

  • David Sullivan wrote:

    Can­not? You can Re Cre­ate But You can­not Create.??

  • @ David — Some­thing like that, yeah. The older notion of how it is we came up with any­thing orig­i­nal was that it already had to be in our head before hand.

    There had to be a world of ideas, Plato’s “forms,” where if we saw some­thing that was a table, the way we’d rec­og­nize it is because in our head was an ideal form of “table.”

    This really weird notion is obvi­ously meant to be a metaphor, which is: “being” (what is) = “truth.” Now the funny thing is that “being,” what actu­ally is the case, is the truth. Why on earth do we need a weird metaphor to express this?

    So once again there’s some kind of divorce between who we are now and our ori­gins, and maybe all we’re doing is act­ing out our ori­gins. I mean, remem­ber how heroes work — we copy how another per­son acts, we imi­tate. We pat­tern our­selves a cer­tain way. The notion that “for every­thing there is a sea­son under the heav­ens” isn’t that alien.

    There is obvi­ously a way to account for orig­i­nal­ity in this scheme: there’s tons of ironies and loose logic at points. One way to directly chal­lenge “being = truth” is to ask whether any­thing is ever sta­ble within time. Her­a­cli­tus said you can’t step into the same river twice, that all is flux. If “being” is actu­ally “becom­ing,” then what about truth?

  • Also, for Aris­to­tle and prob­a­bly for Plato — there is a dis­tinc­tion not just between “doing” and “being,” but also between “mak­ing” and “doing.” Cre­ation is some kind of mid­dle ground between any old action and a realm where no action is necessary.

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