I want to take time to address the issue of making money and living virtuously in the context of something else I was planning to write on. The issue for me is the list of Aristotle’s virtues in Bk. 2, Chp. 7. There, he gives 9 or 11 sorts of “means” a virtuous man must hit regarding his temperament; he must not be excessive or deficient in how he considers any of these characteristics. For example, to be courageous is a “mean” whereby one can be as courageous as possible. But to lack all fear is one “excess” - “rashness” - and to have too much fear is “cowardice.”

The list itself is preceded by a discussion in Bk. 2 Chp. 6 where it looks like Aristotle is giving us an account of virtue that is as simple as possible to follow. He wants people to be more thoughtful about virtuous action, hence there is the distinction made between things good for one end (an eye), things good for several ends (a horse), and things that may choose what ends they are good for (a human being, by implication - he does not say this outright at 1106a 15-25). At the same time, just because a mean is for humans is not as simple as one in arithmetic (1106a 26- 1106b5), we should not believe that reasoning about the “mean” is all there is. Plato was Aristotle’s teacher and absolutely counseled thinking about what is highest if one could.

We can see what Aristotle is up to when “craftsmanship” is invoked as something that considers a “mean condition” (1106b 14). Yes, there is a law-making art, yes, philosophy does begin from consideration of what sorts of excellences are pursued in the arts. But still, Aristotle is emphatic if we let him be: “I am speaking of virtue of character, for this is concerned with feelings and actions, and among these there is excess and deficiency, and the mean” (1106b 17-19). It is this context which allows him to praise the Pythagoreans, a strange ally, as thinking correctly that “The good are good simply, but the bad are bad in every sort of way” (1106b 35).

The trouble with saying there is a diversity of goods, stemming from human reason, that can be reconciled through human reason to a greater degree than most think, is that people won’t praise a plethora of things. If the philosopher organizes things hierarchically, well, people who do not philosophize are more adherent to one hierarchy and as we all know, are quite dogmatic about what they are stuck to. The question of getting people to act virtuously involves praise. Everyone needs praise to some degree if the basis of reason is our social interaction (logos - if speech, then reason). We cannot exist in a vacuum. Even Aristotle needs praise, or something with which he can feel respected through (the key allusion to praise setting this analysis forth is in 1106b 17-35. He uses the term several times there).

To give Josh a preliminary answer - can you see how being good without being purely rational, i.e. an angel - must involve some degree of what we would consider material compensation?

This reasoning about “praise” is extended in the list of virtues in Chapter 7 to great effect. The list of virtues in chapter 7, if we dispose of the final two, which are means in actually feeling, is as follows:

1. courage
2. temperance
3. generosity (private giving)
4. magnificence (public spending)
5. greatness of soul (proper concern for honor)
6. gentleness (still having the capability to be angry, but not unnecessarily so)
7. truthfulness
8. charm (for situations that are playful)
9. genuineness (for all other situations)

A lot of people make fun of Straussians for romanticizing the “center” of any given list. The reason why one does so is Aristotle, though - there are times, as anyone can see from my poetry commentaries, that a list has a certain movement, and the beginning and end will count for more. Here, the center is absolutely key. All these virtues seem to be related to being an aristocrat or man of prominence: wealth is necessary for at least two of them (#3 and 4).

“Greatness of soul,” then, is the key - an aristocrat, a lover of what is best, is really an honor lover. And that’s not a bad thing - look at all the virtues he can possess. But it does mean he needs money, and needs to be honored, and that a higher sort of rationality is not quite a concern.

If we include the two “mean” feelings - one being a sense of shame, i.e. modesty (superseded by the fact one has to grow out of this to be a fully functioning adult), and “righteous indignation” (superseded eventually by a full sense of justice) - these two feelings being that which allow education in these virtues to take place, what we get as the center of the list is “gentleness.” I think a not unsubtle message is being sent by Aristotle here about the priority of courage in his schema - it is something that education helps mold. It cannot be wholly transcended as anarchists or the Left might wish it to be, for following Rousseau, they do believe in a softer humanity and better future through a more peaceable world. And there is a lot to that. What is surprising, of course, is how much thumos is extended in making those sorts of arguments.

The Aristotlean understanding does not try to transcend, but to mold. And note that “gentleness” does not quite extend to all men. While all men need some honor, some wealth, if we can conceive of Socrates, we can conceive of someone wholly gentle in one way - he fights when called upon for the city only - and not quite as gentle as another. Witness his utter decimation of many interlocutors.

The point is, this list is not the whole story. But for our purposes, since wealth and honor are integral to life, they cannot automatically be seen as taints. Another question, which is whether people can handle the wealth or honor they are given, is more central.

One Response to “Do Money and Material Gain Taint Thought, or Validity of Opinion? On Aristotle’s Ethics, Bk. 2 Chp. 7”

1. Josh on May 17th, 2007 9:08 am

   I like how you use the word automatically in regards to wealth and honor being taints. I would then ask how this applies to a saint? Here is someone that wishes no praise or money/wealth, are they not virtuous or am I missing something?

   I do see the distinction you are making and the point. One needs a certain amount of wealth in order to be functional at a certain level.

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