Davis says, regarding Aristotle, that there are “four possibilities for the action in tragedy:”

1. “A character may intend to do something knowing what he is doing, but because of some accident not do it – this is not really drama.”

2. “A character may intend to do something knowing what he is doing and do it.” (case of Medea)

3. “A character may do something wihout intending to have done it and then discover what he has done” (case of Oedipus).

4. “A character may intend to do something, discover that he did not really know what he was doing, and not do it” (Iphigeneia)

Davis’ list (all quotes above are his, from his Introduction to the Poetics) makes perfect sense, based on on the possibilities of combining “action” with “knowledge.” Only one slight qualm – where the hell is this in the text? See Poetics 1453b 25 – 1454a 10:

“But let us say what we mean more clearly by “beautifully.” Just as it is possible for the action to come to be in just they way the ancients made it, knowingly and with cognizance, and as Euripides made Medea kill her children, so it is also possible to act, and, being ignorant, to do what is terrible and then afterward to recognize the friendship, just like Sophocles’ Oedipus. Now this is outside the drama, but it can be in the tragedy itself, such as Astydamas’ Alcmeon or Telegonus in the Wounded Odysseus. And further, a third besides these is to intend to do something beyond cure because of ignorance but to recognize before doing it. And besides these it is not possible in a different way. For it is necessary either to act or not and knowingly or not knowingly. Of these, to intend while cognizant and not to act is worst, for it is loathsome and not tragic, since it is without suffering. There no one makes it like this, unless rarely, such as, in Antigone, Haemon toward Creon. Second is to act, but it is better for the ignorant to act and, having acted, to recognize. For the loathsome is not attached to it, and the recognition is astounding. But the strongest is the last; I mean, for example, in the Cresphontes, Merope intends to kill her son and does not kill him but recognizes him, and, in the Iphigeneia, the sister goes through this with her brother, and, in the Helle, the son, intending to betray his mother, recognizes her. Because of this, as was said some time ago, tragedies are not about many families.”

I see Medea and Oedipus – acting with knowledge, and acting ignorantly and knowing later – and I see the possibility of intending, but then knowing and not acting. So that’s 3 of the 4 on Davis’ list. But right after that third possibility comes this:

For it is necessary either to act or not and knowingly or not knowingly. Of these, to intend while cognizant and not to act is worst, for it is loathsome and not tragic, since it is without suffering.

This is not a list of four we are being given. It is two lists of three, one list where two of the three possibilities are given examples (Medea & Oedipus), and one possibility with no example. Then there is a list where a new possibility is given and ranked with two others. Now two possibilities are common to both lists, the latter parts of both lists – the middle, where there is ignorant action resulting in recognition later, and the end, where one intends, realizes something, fails to act and thus avoids suffering.

Davis, in missing that there are two lists, fails to recognize the parallel between the two that Aristotle is suggesting. Haemon’s inaction is the same thing as Medea’s bloodlust, given that Haemon had knowledge that could make things right. But Oedipus’ terrible actions that result in his recognition of friendship are not strictly paralleled in the second list. The second list just talks about action generally, and what would be better. Finally, what was general in the first list is made specific in the ranked list.

What on earth is going on here? We could do as Davis does, and reduce 6 to 4. But Aristotle started this discussion talking about beauty, and ends it talking about family. There is something about knowledge which prevents action that is highest and most beautiful, as it sees relations between things. To see what is similar is to see the fullness of Being.

We are moving from the most tragic in both lists – knowledge resulting in action/inaction that is harmful – to the comic, where knowledge results in a recognition of a more fundamentally just order than was seen before. All’s well that ends well, after all.

And now you can see how these two lists are linked. They’re not linked because they “logically” collapse into a list of 4. They’re linked because each list has an internal movement that parallels the other. Aristotle is working from the starting point of “knowledge causes harm in two cases, when it is used to cause harm, and when it is not used at all,” and thus needs two separate starting points for what is ugliest in man. He then moves to that which we can all share in, that which is highest, the intellect that sees the highest and does not want to descend into mere action.

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Comments

One Response to “The Problem of Knowledge and Action in Aristotle’s Poetics”

  1. Rocky on December 10th, 2008 4:04 pm

    Dear Ashok, Neither arguing nor opposing you,
    have you ever try to read your own self-one of the most important philosophical question-Who I Am?
    What I observe is that you are in timeless position of mind where past and future both become present, and because your source of knowledge is books,you think you r getting it from the past.
    Analyzing contents and analyzing experiencer of contents are two different things.Every theory of philosophy by Kant or Aristotle,Einstein or any other philosopher is indication towards one and only one question-Who I Am? -That’s what I have learned from these great men.
    Just sharing my experience with u -:)
    All the best!

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